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WHEN GUILT SHOULD BE IRRELEVANT:
GOVERNMENT OVERREACHING AS A BAR
TO REPROSECUTION UNDER THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AFTER
OREGON V KENNEDY
James F Ponsoldtt
One of the recurring patterns of the Burger Court jurisprudence in
criminal cases is its focus upon the guilt or innocence of the accused
rather than upon "collateral" concerns arising under the Bill of Rights.I
The Court has sought to deemphasize the effects of prosecutorial mis-
conduct or overreaching,2 concerns that traditionally have been relevant
to and raised in such contexts as entrapment, 3 failure of pretrial disclo-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia Law School. A.B. 1968, Cornell
University; J.D. 1972, Harvard University. The author expresses appreciation for the re-
search assistance of Roy Paul, a member of the Georgia Bar.
I See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 535 (1975). This trend has been the subject of academic comment. See Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Grano,
Kirby, Biggers & Ash, Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against The Danger of Convicting the
Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717, 719 (1974).
For an interesting if somewhat cynical opposing view, see Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
436 (1980). Seidman argues that although the Burger Court expresses concern for the central
role of guilt determination in individual cases, it is actually more interested in the broader
social policy of deterring crime. He concludes that, "[t]here may be societies in which . . . a
true jurisprudence of guilt or innocence might be possible. But that is not our society." Id at
502.
2 Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms "misconduct" and "overreach-
ing" are not synonymous. Generally, the courts define virtually any government error in con-
duct as misconduct. Overreaching, a narrow subcategory of misconduct, ties that conduct
and the intended goal of achieving a conviction to some greater degree of mens rea. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 102-03).
3 The Burger Court has applied a "subjective" test for entrapment in which the con-
duct of the police is largely irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) (Official Draft 1962) and several state courts focus primarily
upon police misconduct, viewing the entrapment defense as prophylactic. See, e.g., People v.
Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591 P.2d 947, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1979) (California Supreme Court
rejects Russell).
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sure,4 and suppression hearings. 5 Because the relevance of prosecutorial
misconduct in a criminal trial has been judicially defined in each of
these contexts, the Court acts within its discretion in focusing its atten-
tion on the fundamental question of guilt or innocence. 6
The Burger Court's shift of attention away from prosecutorial con-
duct has been most evident in its developing double jeopardy jurispru-
dence; significantly, it is only in this area of the law that the language of
the Constitution presumptively and directly limits judicial discretion to
ignore prosecutorial misconduct. 7 In Oregon v. Kennedy, 8 the Court held
that prosecutorial misconduct bars reprosecution after a mistrial only if
that conduct was specifically designed to cause a mistrial,9 regardless of
its unlawfulness and impact upon the integrity of the trial. The primary
rationale for the Court's holding was that any test that barred re-
4 Compare United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (when evaluating effect of
nondisclosure, standard must reflect "overriding concern with the justice of finding of guilt")
with Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (presentation of testimony
known to be perjured is denial of due process). The current due process test to determine the
significance of a failure of government disclosure emphasizes the materiality of the withheld
information rather than government culpability in obtaining or withholding it.
5 Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978) (petitioners not entitled to chal-
lenge legality of search where they did not own searched vehicle) with Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (legitimate presence on searched premises entitles one to challenge
legality of search). Although Raka was nominally a fourth amendment standing case, its
result is to render evidence of an unlawful police search irrelevant in many cases, despite the
prophylactic role of the exclusionary rules.
6 The assumption by the Burger Court and many commentators that the Court's fun-
damental purpose is to enhance the reliability of guilt determination begs the question ad-
dressed in this article. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970). The framers of the Bill of Rights believed that
government utilization of oppressive conduct to investigate and prosecute the accused had
substantial social and political costs, even if criminals were punished and the crime rate was
reduced. The premises of this article are, first, that an over resourceful prosecution effort will
not necessarily enhance truth-seeking procedures, and second, that even if our society could
thereby achieve such a goal, the values underlying the double jeopardy clause should serve to
restrain the executive branch from obtaining convictions through improper conduct. See gen-
erally L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW (1974).
7 The mandatory language of the clause, "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," precludes a second jeopardy regardless of
factual guilt or innocence. The original draft of the clause prepared by Madison protected an
accused against "more than one trial or one punishment for the same offence .... " That
language was modified slightly to protect the individual from the harshness of the English
rule, which precluded all requests for a new trial. I ANNALS OF CONG. 434, 753 (J. Gales ed.
1789). See 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 515-22 (8th ed. 1824); Note, Statutooy Imple-
mentation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.
339 (1956). Under the modern theory, a defendant seeks dismissal of the indictment, not a
new trial, when invoking the double jeopardy clause in a pretrial motion. It is the govern-
ment, rather than the defendant, that initiates reprosecution once a court has vacated a con-
viction or terminated a trial. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
8 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The Court's decision to grant review in Kennedy was anticipated
by Justice Marshall's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Green v. United States, 451 U.S.
929 (1981).
9 456 U.S. at 679.
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prosecution based upon government misconduct or overreaching during
the first trial would be standardless and arbitrary. 10 The Court's deci-
sion in Oregon v. Kennedy narrows prior interpretations of the double jeop-
ardy clause and reflects the Burger Court's continuing emphasis on guilt
determination as the primary function of the criminal justice system.
This article examines the effect of Oregon v. Kennedy on the Burger
Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence in cases where government mis-
conduct has interfered with the integrity of a first trial."' The article
proposes the complete elimination of current distinctions between mis-
trial and appellate reversal cases for double jeopardy analysis, on the
ground that those distinctions no longer have intellectual or practical
support. Moreover, against the contention of the Court in Oregon v. Ken-
nedy that any test for overreaching necessarily would be standardless,
this article proposes the adoption of a "plain error" standard. Under
this test, "plain" government error, engaged in with the purpose of im-
properly seeking a conviction, that results in a mistrial or appellate re-
versal will preclude a second jeopardy. This proposal is premised upon
the Court's consistent assertion that
[t]he underlying idea [of the double jeopardy clause], one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurispru-
dence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty. 12
10 Id at 677-79. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment only, provided a standard
for overreaching previously utilized by some lower courts. Id. at 681 (Stevens, J., concurring).
I Oregon v. Kennedy has left several questions unanswered. For example, will a second
jeopardy be barred only on a finding that the prosecutor's sole objective was to cause a mis-
trial, or will the existence of a general intent to prejudice the defendant be sufficient? If an
appellate court disagrees with the trial court's progovernment resolution of the issue of
prosecutorial intent, may it direct a dismissal of the indictment notwithstanding the Ball rule
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 64-70)? These unanswered questions are likely to
produce confusion in the lower federal courts and in the state courts. Every state incorporates
some form of double jeopardy protection in its constitution or common law. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From A
Reactiona Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1 (1981). Of course a state is free to interpret
its double jeopardy protection more expansively than the Court in Oregon v. Kennedy Justice
Brennan in a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but dissenting from the rationale
of the majority, stated that nothing in the Court's holding would prevent the Oregon court,
on remand, from concluding that retrial would violate the provision of the Oregon Constitu-
tion that prohibits double jeopardy. 456 U.S. at 666-67 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
12 This description of the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause was first ar-
ticulated by Justice Black in his opinion for the Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187-88 (1957), and was reiterated by the Court in Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.S. 784,
795-96 (1969), and in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117. 127-21 1980).
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The article concludes that the principles that have evolved in recent
double jeopardy decisions undercut both the mandatory language of the
clause and its "underlying idea."
I
THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAUSE
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."1 3 Recently, in
United States v. DiFrancesco, 14 the Supreme Court observed that the appli-
cation of this provision "has not proved to be facile or routine"15 and
noted that recent double jeopardy cases reflect "acknowledged changes
in direction or in emphasis."16 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
certain "general principles emerge from the Court's double jeopardy de-
cisions and may be regarded as essentially settled."' 7 Two of those al-
legedly settled principles are the focus of this article. First, under the
long-standing rule of United States v. Perez, 18 despite the apparently
mandatory language of the clause, a defendant may be retried and thus
placed in jeopardy a second time where a trial judge declares a mistrial
sua sponte or at the request of the prosecutor on grounds of "manifest
necessity," thereby aborting the first trial prior to a verdict. Second,
"reprosecution of a defendant who has successfully moved for a mistrial
is not barred, so long as the Government did not deliberately seek to
provoke the mistrial request."' 9
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The recent increase in double jeopardy litigation stems from
the application of double jeopardy protection to state as well as federal proceedings. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
14 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
15 Id at 127.
16 Id Such "changes in direction" have included, for example, the holding in United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), authorizing the reprosecution of a defendant who success-
fully terminated his prosecution prior to verdict. Scott expressly overruled the contrary hold-
ing in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
17 Id
18 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). At the time of Perez, the Congress had not yet granted
defendants a statutory right to appeal wrongful convictions. See generally United States v.
Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294-95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204) (denying writ of error on
ground that double jeopardy precluded second trial). Although Gibert did not survive, United
States v. Harding, 26 F. Cas. 131, 137 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846) (No. 15,301), its elimination was
not based upon any erosion of double jeopardy protection.
19 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). The Court cited United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-11 (1976), another recent Burger Court double jeopardy
decision, as authority for this proposition. See in/ra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. Al-
though the Court adopted the language from Dinitz and DiFrancesco in Oregon v. Kennedy, see
456 U.S. at 673-74, Justice Stevens characterized the Court's holding as one that "gratui-
tously lops off a portion of the previously recognized exception." Id at 681 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in judgment). Justice Stevens stated that a reprosecution was barred in cases where
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In Oregon v. Kennedy, the Court considered the issue of whether gov-
ernment intent to provoke a mistrial was the sole basis for precluding
retrial after a mistrial.20 In a five-to-four vote marked by broad disa-
greement between Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, an ambiguous con-
currence by Justice Powell, and an "about-face" by Justice White,2 ' the
Court concluded that, unless the challenged prosecutorial "overreach-
ing" was intended to abort the trial, it cannot be raised to bar reprosecu-
tion under the double jeopardy clause. 22
Premising all double jeopardy analysis is a literal reading of the
double jeopardy clause that would preclude every second jeopardy with-
out exception. The history of that clause and of the Bill of Rights gener-
ally, demonstrates a fundamental concern for preventing various forms
of government overreaching common during the 18th century, includ-
ing successive prosecutions designed to oppress citizens. 23 Presumably,
"the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial, or otherwise engaged in 'overreaching' or
'harassment.'" Id at 683.
The Court stated another arguably settled double jeopardy principle in United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1976): "[T]he defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termina-
tion of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the
offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause
if the Government is permitted to appeal." In Scott, the double jeopardy issue arose following
a preverdict dismissal of the indictment, rather than following a midtrial declaration of mis-
trial, as is more usually the case.
20 Justice Marshall, in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Green o. United States,
stated:
Regardless of whether the Government's misbehavior was designed specifi-
cally to provoke a mistrial or was simply intended to reduce the chances of an
acquittal, the net effect on the defendant is the same: he is faced with the
burdens and risks of a second trial solely because the Government has deliber-
ately undermined the integrity of the first proceeding.
451 U.S. 929, 931 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21 Justice White, who had dissented in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), see
supra note 19, and also in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (discussed infia at text
accompanying notes 33-36), joined the majority in Oregon v. Kenned. Justice Powell, concur-
ring with the majority and providing the swing vote, wrote separately to indicate that, had
there been "objective" evidence of prosecutorial intent to cause a mistrial, he might have
voted differently. 456 U.S. at 679-80 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The Court's deci-
sion was unanimous in reversing the Oregon court's judgment, which had found overreaching
and precluded retrial. Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion agreed with the result but
disagreed with the rule established by the majority that prosecutorial conduct was relevant
only if it evidenced an intent to cause a mistrial.
22 The alleged prosecutorial misconduct in Oregon v. Kennedy consisted of questioning by
the prosecutor of an expert witness in which the prosecutor asked whether the witness had
declined to do business with the defendant "because [the defendant] is a crook." 456 U.S. at
669. The prosecutor thus arguably communicated his personal opinion of the defendant to
the jury, relating facts not in evidence. The trial court immediately granted the defense mo-
tion for a mistrial. Id
For a recent lower court application of Oregon v. Kennedy, see United States v. Poe, 713
F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1983), where the court of appeals reinstated an indictment after the in-
dictment had been dismissed by the trial court on grounds of governmental overreaching.
23 See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Exparte Lange. 85 U.S. (18 Wall)
163 (1873); Note, supra note 7, at 350.
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judicial interpretations of the clause therefore should defer to the
mandatory language of the Constitution, unless a clear policy consistent
with the clause can be maintained.
The Court's interpretations of the principles underlying double
jeopardy protection demonstrate two primary concerns: "protection of
the defendant from harassment, and preservation of the defendant's op-
portunity to obtain a favorable verdict by the first tribunal he con-
fronts."'24 An understanding of the relationship between these interests
reveals the inadequacy of the Court's present analysis, which wrongly
assumes that the Court's sole constitutional function is to defer to jury
determinations of guilt or innocence whenever such determinations oc-
cur. A conceptual foundation for double jeopardy protection is that a
jury's guilt determination may be less reliable if it occurs after a second
trial, when the government has familiarized itself with the defense and
marshalled its forces through the effective creation, control, and modifi-
cation of the evidence.
A defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a partic-
ular tribunal" was first formulated in those terms by Justice Black in his
decision for the Court in Wade v. Hunter. 25 Justice Black recognized that
the protection of a defendant's interest in a particular forum is a neces-
sary result of the attachment of double jeopardy protection before final
verdict, a distinctive feature of the American justice system that "dis-
plays a much greater sensitivity for the individual rights of the criminal
defendant. ' 26 Justice Black noted, however, that the defendant's inter-
est "must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in
fair trials designed to end in just judgments" 27 and found under the
unique facts of Wade that the double jeopardy clause posed no bar to
retrial.28
24 Comment, Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial- Is the Manifest Necessity Test
Manfestly Necessag?, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 887, 888 (1975).
25 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
26 Comment, The Double Jeopardy Clause and Mistrials Granted on Defendant's Motion: What
Kind of Prosecutorial Misconduct Precludes Reprosecution?, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 103, 107 n.23 (1979).
In England, retrial after the declaration of mistrial raises no double jeopardy issue because
under the English law jeopardy does not attach until a final verdict is rendered. One com-
mentator has suggested that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to adopt a differ-
ent rule for American criminal proceedings. See Note, Double Jeopardy. The Reprosecution
Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1273 (1964). Nevertheless, it is well settled that, in the
United States, jeopardy attaches when the jury has been sworn in a jury trial and when
evidence is first presented in a nonjury trial. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (federal
rule on attachment of jeopardy is binding on states); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377
(1975) (jeopardy attaches in nonjury trial when evidence is first presented); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (jeopardy attaches when jury is impaneled and sworn). See
generally Comment, supra note 24, at 888-89.
27 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
28 In Wade, a World War II court-martial was dissolved because of military considera-
tions and transferred to a different tribunal for retrial. The original court-martial was com-
posed of officers of the Third Army at the time of the Allied invasion of Germany in March
1983)
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In United States V. Jon, 2 9 the Court renewed its examination of the
right to a particular forum and distinguished it from the defendant's
interest in protection from prosecutorial or judicial overreaching. The
Court observed:
If that right to go to a particular tribunal is valued, it is because,
independent of the threat of bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecu-
tor, the defendant has a significant interest in the decision whether or
not to take the case from the jury when circumstances occur which
might be thought to warrant a declaration of mistri1. . . . In the
absence of [a motion by the defendant for mistrial] the Perez doctrine
of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to fore-
close the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial dis-
cretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would
not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.30
The Court applied the Perez doctrine in Simmons v. United States,31 hold-
ing that the presence of jury bias created a manifest necessity for mis-
trial and that denial of a retrial would defeat the ends of justice.32
1945. The Court found that there was manifest necessity for the termination of the original
proceedings in stating that "[m]omentous issues hung on the invasion and we cannot assume
that these court-martial officers were not needed to perform their military functions." Id at
692.
29 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion). Injorn, the trial judge declared a mistrial sua
sponte to ensure that witnesses for the prosecution were fully apprised of their fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination.
30 Id at 485. The Perez doctrine referred to by the Court inJorn is the starting point for
any consideration of double jeopardy issues relating to mistrial. In United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824), the Court stated:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts ofjustice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a mani-
fest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is
impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to
interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes ....
The evolution of the Perez manifest necessity test has generated extensive commentary. See
Holleman, Misials and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 14 GA. L. REv. 45 (1979) (Supreme Court's
mistrial decisions rely on procedural mechanisms in order to protect double jeopardy interests
of defendants); Schulhofer,Jeopardy and Mzirial, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 449 (1977); Comment,
The Double Jeopard Dilemma.- Reprosecution After Mistrial on Defendant's Motion, 63 IOwA L. REv.
975, 977-82 (1978); Comment, supra note 24, at 891-904.
31 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
32 The Court did not directly examine the Perez standard again until Wade, decided
more than half a century after Simmons. The Court's expansion of Perez after Wade can be
traced chronologically through the following cases: Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961)
(retrial permissible where trial judge declared mistrial for defendant's benefit); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (retrial barred where mistrial granted at prosecutor's re-
quest because one of prosecution's witnesses failed to appear for trial); United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470 (1971) (retrial barred where judge, acting without defendant's consent, aborted
trial to ensure that prosecution witnesses were fully apprised of their right against self-incrimi-
nation); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (retrial permissible after defense request
for mistrial where trial judge's expulsion of defendant's trial attorney was not in bad faith);
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At the beginning of the Burger Court era of double jeopardy juris-
prudence, the Court in Illinois v. Somerville33 again emphasized the dis-
tinction between the defendant's interests in a particular forum and his
interest in avoiding governmental overreaching. In that case, the de-
fendant was indicted under Illinois law for theft, but it was discovered
during trial that the indictment was fatally deficient for failure to allege
a necessary element of that offense.34 Under Illinois law, this defect
could not be cured by amendment, 35 leaving mistrial and reindictment
as the only possible remedies. The Court found that
where the declaration of a mistrial implements a reasonable state pol-
icy and aborts a proceeding that at best would have produced a ver-
dict that could have been upset at will by one of the parties, the
defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the
competing and equally legitimate demand for public justice.36
Significantly, however, the Court recognized that "the declaration of a
mistrial on the basis of a rule or a defective procedure that would lend
itself to prosecutorial manipulation would involve an entirely different
question . . . 37
Although Wade, Jon, and Somerville reinforced the understanding
that mistrial cases implicate two distinct double jeopardy interests,
United States v. Dinitz 38 marked the first time that the Court explored
the potential conflict between those considerations. The defendant, Na-
than Dinitz, was charged with conspiracy to distribute, and actual dis-
tribution of, LSD.3 9 Dinitz retained one attorney on the day of his
arrest and retained additional counsel five days before trial to conduct
his defense.'' The trial judge ordered Dinitz's trial counsel to leave the
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514-17 (1978) (retrial permissible where trial judge
exercised "sound discretion" in declaring mistrial because of prejudicial comment during de-
fense counsel's opening statement despite fact that judge failed to make explicit finding of
"manifest necessity").
33 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
34 Id at 459.
35 Id at 460.
36 Id at 471 (citation omitted).
37 Id at 464. In finding that the danger of prosecutorial manipulation was not present
in Somerville, the Court distinguished the earlier case of Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963). In Downum the trial judge declared a mistrial when the prosecution failed to
produce a witness. The Court noted that the situation in Somerville was "unlike Downum,
where the mistrial entailed not only a delay for the defendant, but also operated as a post-
jeopardy continuance to allow the prosecution an opportunity to strengthen its case." Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. at 469.
38 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
39 Id at 601-02.
40 Id at 602. Dinitz's trial counsel was permitted to appear before the court pro hac vice
because he had not been admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida. Dinitz also had retained a third attorney, a law professor, to
assist with the issues of law.
1983]
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courthouse because of repeated misconduct. 41 Dinitz's other attorneys
were not prepared to proceed, and moved for a mistrial.42 The court of
appeals concluded that the trial judge's decision to exclude Dinitz's trial
attorney left the defendant with no choice but to move for a mistrial. 43
The appellate court based its review of the impact of Dinitz's mistrial
motion on his double jeopardy claim on the theory that only a voluntary
waiver of his constitutional right would permit a retrial. 44 Because the
defendant had no real choice, the appellate court ignored Dinitz's mo-
tion for mistrial and instead analyzed the circumstances under the man-
ifest necessity test of United States v. Perez as if the trial judge had
declared a mistrial over Dinitz's objection. The court of appeals found
that the actions of the judge were not supported by manifest necessity
given the availability of options less drastic than expelling defendant's
counsel.45 The court thus concluded that retrial violated the defend-
ant's right not to be twice put in jeopardy.46
The Supreme Court reversed, attacking the court of appeals' reli-
ance on waiver analysis. The Court found little merit in the appellate
court's conclusion that it could disregard Dinitz's motion for mistrial
because it viewed that motion as the involuntary product of a "Hobson's
choice" and not as a voluntary waiver of double jeopardy protection.
The Court emphasized that "traditional waiver concepts have little rele-
vance where the defendant must determine whether or not to request or
consent to a mistrial in response to judicial or prosecutorial error."'47 It
asserted that waiver analysis
erroneously treats the defendant's interest in going forward before the
first jury as a constitutional right comparable to the right to counsel.
It fails to recognize that the protection against the burden of multiple
prosecutions underlying the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy may be served by a mistrial declaration and the concomitant
41 Id at 603.
42 The trial court offered Dinitz three options: "(1) a stay or recess pending application
to the Court of Appeals to review the propriety of expelling Wagner [the attorney guilty of
misconduct], (2) continuation of the trial with Meldon and Baldwin as counsel, or (3) a decla-
ration of a mistrial which would permit the respondent to obtain other counsel." Id at 604.
43 United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53, 59 (5th Cir.), a'don reh'g, 504 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.
1974) (en banc), rev'd, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
44 492 F.2d at 58-59.
45 The court of appeals stated:
[T]he judge could have warned Wagner that he would be cited for contempt
if such practices continued. He could have actually cited him for contempt
and imposed post trial sanctions for each citation, if he thought Wagner's
conduct amounted to obstructing the performance of his judicial duty ....
The trial judge could have caused a complaint to be filed with the grievance
committee of the state bar or taken post trial steps to prevent him from being
admitted to practice before the Northern District of Florida.
Id at 60-61.
46 Id at 54.
47 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1976).
[Vol. 69:76
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
relinquishment of the opportunity to obtain a verdict from the first
jury.48
Relying on its prior holdings that the double jeopardy clause presents no
barrier to retrial when a conviction is overturned on appeal, 49 the Court
observed that a defendant might find it in his own interest, when faced
with prejudicial error, to choose an immediate retrial following mistrial
instead of proceeding to a tainted conviction followed by an appeal,
reversal, and eventual retrial.50 "In such circumstances, a defendant's
mistrial request has objectives not unlike the interests served by the
Double Jeopardy Clause-the avoidance of anxiety, expense, and delay
occasioned by multiple prosecutions." 5' Given these possible objectives,
the Court found that "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control
over the course to be followed in the event of [prosecutorial or judicial]
error."5 2 Thus, the Court in rejecting waiver analysis as a basis for re-
viewing a defendant's double jeopardy claim, erected a more limited
rule that would vitiate double jeopardy protection whenever the defend-
ant formally initiated the procedure resulting in the need for a second
jeopardy. Dinitz thus marks a radical departure from prior case law re-
garding the waiver of constitutional rights.5 3
Having established a formalistic rule of defendant choice in situa-
tions involving prosecutorial or judicial error, the Dinitz Court neverthe-
less articulated a crucial qualification. The Court reaffirmed the
understanding that
[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against gov-
ernmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby
to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple
prosecutions. It bars retrials where "bad-faith conduct by judge or
prosecutor," threatens the "[h]arassment of an accused by successive
prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution
a more favorable opportunity to convict" the defendant. 54
48 Id at 609 n.l1.
49 See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); infra notes 64-86 and accompany-
ing text.
50 424 U.S. at 610.
51 Id at 608.
52 Id at 609.
53 The double jeopardy protection has been effectively relegated, without explanation,
to some lesser category of rights, which can more easily be waived. By comparison, the sixth
amendment right to assistance of counsel may be waived only if the waiver is an intelligent
and competent one. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). For a discussion of waiver analysis as it relates to mistrial and dismissal cases and
the double jeopardy clause, see Note, A Resolution of the Mistrial-Dismisal Dichotomy in Double
Jeopardy Contexts, 64 IowA L. REv. 903, 914-18 (1979). See generally Comment, Double Jeopardy:
The Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 549 (1977).
54 424 U.S. at 611 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) and Down-
um v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)) (citations omitted).
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Thus, the Court still recognized that regardless of defendant choice,
some level of prosecutorial or judicial conduct always should bar retrial
following a mistrial.
In Arizona v. Washington,55 the Court reiterated the qualification
stated in Dinitz. As in Dinitz, the trial judge in Washington declared a
mistrial because of improper comments made by defense counsel in the
opening statement. 56 The trial judge in Washington, however, declared a
mistrial at the behest of the prosecutor, rather than at the defendant's
request. The Supreme Court observed that in assessing a trial judge's
decision to declare a mistrial, "the strictest scrutiny is appropriate when
the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution evi-
dence, or when there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the
superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical advan-
tage over the accused."' 57 The Court concluded, however, that in the
absence of such considerations, "a trial judge's decision to declare a mis-
trial based on his assessment of the prejudicial impact of improper argu-
ment is entitled to great deference."58
The cases discussed above reveal two distinct situations that impli-
cate the considerations of protecting the defendant's right to a particu-
lar forum and ensuring that the defendant is free from government
harassment. In cases such asJorn, in which the judge declares a mistrial
sua sponte, and Washington, in which the trial judge declares mistrial on
the prosecution motion, the mistrial might function to give the prosecu-
tor an advantage at retrial. In order to avoid this possibility, the Court
has asserted that "[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions
or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict are examples when jeopardy at-
taches."' 59 In these cases, the defendant's right to a particular forum
complements his interest in being free of governmental harassment. If
the government seeks to use mistrial as a device for strengthening its
cases for future proceedings, protection of the defendant's right to pro-
ceed before the first forum serves to protect the defendant's interest in
avoiding such governmental harassment. Both interests are vindicated
if the trial judge allows the defendant to continue before the first forum
until there is a clear showing of manifest necessity for mistrial that rests
on circumstances that do not lend themselves to prosecutorial
55 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
56 Id at 501.
57 Id at 508 (footnotes omitted). For an analysis of the precedential value of Washington,
see Holleman, supra note 30, at 55-68.
58 434 U.S. at 514. The Court in Washington concluded that the trial judge had used
"sound discretion" in granting a mistrial and reversed the court of appeals holding that the
defendant had made a valid double jeopardy claim. Id at 516.
59 Id at 508 n.25 (quoting Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)).
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manipulation.60
Different considerations attach in cases such as Dinitz where the
defendant himself moves for mistrial.6 ' Where the defendant's motion is
made in the face of prejudicial prosecutorial conduct or judicial error,
the interest in proceeding before the first forum is in potential conflict
with the interest in avoiding governmental harassment. Often, in such
cases the government does not seek to provoke a mistrial, preferring in-
stead the opportunity to prevail in the first forum based on its prejudi-
cial activities. Thus, continuing in the first forum will not protect the
defendant from harassment. In order to protect defendants from this
conduct, the Court in Dinitz and Washington recognized that despite the
defendant's right to choose whether to proceed before the initial forum,
some level of misconduct must be viewed as barring retrial if the double
jeopardy clause is to have significance.62 This limitation on the right to
retry defendants is necessary to protect citizens from governmental
abuses of power; a goal which is, after all, the fundamental principle
underlying the mandatory language of the double jeopardy clause. Cur-
rent double jeopardy jurisprudence, however, provides no analytical ba-
sis for this protective rule, a legal vacuum that the Supreme Court
recognized and relied upon in Oregon v. Kennedy. 63
II
THE SEARCH FOR ANALYTICAL CONSISTENCY:
ELIMINATING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MISTRIAL AND APPELLATE REVERSAL
CASES
In 1896 the Supreme Court stated in UnitedStates v. Bal/64 that "it is
quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment against him
60 See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973). The means by which the govern-
ment seeks to force the defendant to move for mistrial may also destroy the defendant's inter-
est in the first forum. In such a case, proceeding before the first forum will not protect the
defendant from harassment. If the defendant fails to move for mistrial in the face of govern-
mental overreaching, the judge must declare a mistrial sua sponte in order to protect the
defendant from harassment. See Comment, supra note 26, at 120; Comment, supra note 30, at
982; Comment, Retrial After Mirtrial The Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest Necessity, 45 Miss.
LJ. 1272, 1279 (1974).
61 See supra note 60. The need to bar retrial as a remedy for harassment also may arise in
cases where the defendant does not move for mistrial. Even if the defendant retains "primary
control over the course to be followed," United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976),
there should be some level of misconduct that mandates an end to the original proceedings
and a bar to retrial. Thus, judges may be under a duty to declare mistrials sua sponte on the
grounds of prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.
62 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 508; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611.
63 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). The Court recognized that its earlier decisions had created
confusion as to the appropriate standard for determining when retrial is barred after defend-
ant's successful motion for a mistrial.
64 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same
indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offence of which
he had been convicted. '65 The rationale of the rule, which runs con-
trary to the English view that generally bars retrial of defendants who
have their convictions overturned on appeal, 66 has never been clearly
established:67
Judicial efforts to account for the Ball doctrine in terms of "waiver" of
the defendant's immunity from retrial or in terms of a single "continu-
ing jeopardy" generally are conceded to be conceptually sterile, and
the only real justification for the doctrine is the practical importance
of preventing every trial defect from conferring immunity upon the
accused.68
Application of the Ball rule uniformly allowing retrial after convictions
are overturned on appeal lacks any principled legal foundation. Despite
this absence, the Ball rule may have had a significant impact on the
65 Id at 672 (citations omitted).
66 See Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 456 n.28; Note, supra note 26, at 1280.
67 Several theories attempt to account for the result in Ball. The most widely accepted
rationale has probably been that "[b]y appealing, a defendant is considered to have 'waived'
his double jeopardy protection by asking the court for a new trial. He either accepts the first
verdict or consents to being placed in jeopardy again in order to seek a more favorable ver-
dict." Comment, supra note 24, at 889 (footnote omitted). The waiver rationale, however,
has been criticized. See Mayer & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New T'als and Successive Prosecutions,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-15 (1960). More recent double jeopardy decisions have also eroded
the waiver notion. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957).
Justice Holmes proposed a theory of "continuing jeopardy" to explain why retrial after
reversal on appeal is permissible. Holmes argued that "logically and rationally a man cannot
be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried.
The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause." Kepner
v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Court has rejected
this theory, at least with respect to "previous trial[s] ending in an acquittal; in a conviction
either not reversed on appeal or reversed because of insufficient evidence; and in mistrial
rulings not prompted by manifest necessity." Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 218 (1978)
(citations omitted).
68 Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 456-57 (footnote omitted). In preserving the Ball rule
the Court has noted:
While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of
retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to
explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound
administration of justice. Corresponding to the right of an accused to be
given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear
after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society
to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any
defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to
conviction. From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that
appellate courts would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the
effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal
of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further
prosecution. In reality, therefore, the practice of retrial serves defendants'
rights as well as society's interest.
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
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narrowing of the mistrial rule begun in Dinitz that "[t]he Double Jeop-
ardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions in-
tended to provoke mistrial requests."'69 The Ball rule had created an
incentive for trial judges to deny meritorious motions for mistrial made
on the grounds of prosecutorial overreaching, and certainly to avoid
declarations of mistrial on their own motion. This was because a trial
judge might believe "that society will be better served by completing a
trial, even after clear error has arisen and the defendant seeks the mis-
trial, than the alternative of a mistrial and the possible bar of double
jeopardy based on the error."'70 After Oregon v. Kennedy, the trial judge
need only assure that sufficient evidence exists to support a conclusion
that the prosecutor did not deliberately seek a mistrial. On such a show-
ing, a retrial will not be barred, and thus trial judges may be more will-
ing to declare a mistrial.
Several commentators have identified a different approach, more
consistent with basic double jeopardy policy: "In order to avoid judicial
reluctance to declare a mistrial for fear of immunizing the accused from
further trial, the appeals court should unrestrainedly reverse a convic-
tion and bar retrial on the ground that a mistrial should have been de-
clared. ' '7 1 Recently, in United States v. Opager 72 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit discussed the issue of "whether retrial must be barred
where prosecutorial overreaching exists, motions to dismiss are denied
and the case proceeds to conviction and subsequent reversal on the
grounds of overreaching by the government. '73 The court recognized
that "[t]he policies underlying the double jeopardy clause may be un-
dermined by a tainted proceeding allowed to be completed only because
of a trial judge's erroneous denial of motions for mistrial or motions to
dismiss."'74 Responding to the government's argument that the court
should not bar retrial because Opager retained her valued right to pro-
ceed before the initial forum, the court noted that "this 'valued right'
does not constitute a complete statement of the interests protected by
the double jeopardy clause."75
Indeed, in order to protect defendants from abuses of government
69 424 U.S. at 611; see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978).
70 Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 610 n.12 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53, 63 (5th
Cir. 1974) (Bell, J., dissenting)).
71 Comment, supra note 30, at 989 (footnote omitted); see also Note, supra note 26, at
1280; Comment, supra note 24, at 909.
The Comment discussed supra at note 30, ultimately rejects this approach on the grounds
that it "would de-emphasize the [trial] judge's duty to cure possible error when feasible, and
ignore the defendant who may desire to continue a proceeding that is clearly tainted by
reversible error for reasons of trial strategy." Id at 989.
72 616 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1980).
73 Id at 235.
74 I
75 Id
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power, courts should prohibit retrial in some cases despite a defendant's
right to a particular forum. In fact, more support exists in the common
law to preclude retrial after reversal than after mistrial; at common law,
jeopardy did not attach prior to the verdict.76 To the extent that the
legally sterile rule of United States v. Ball encourages trial courts to deny
double jeopardy protection in mistrial contexts and eliminates the pro-
tection in appellate reversal contexts, a reconsideration of the rule is
appropriate.
The only remaining explanation for the Ball doctrine is the Court's
extra-legal beliefs that the "societal interest in punishing one whose guilt
is clear" overrides the individual's double jeopardy right, and that im-
munizing an accused "from punishment because of any defect sufficient
to constitute reversible error" 77 would cause appellate courts to overlook
trial error and affirm otherwise reversible convictions. This nonconstitu-
tional rationale for the Ball rule amounts to judicial nullification; it as-
sumes a judicial role and judicial authority that the Bill of Rights
pretermits. Preclusion of reprosecution under the double jeopardy
clause, unlike the exclusionary rule, is not a court-created prophylactic
rule but rather a constitutionally mandated bar prohibiting the execu-
tive branch from submitting an accused person to the guilt determina-
tion process more than once. In short, the fifth amendment already has
balanced the "societal interest" in guilt determination and punishment
against the citizen's interest in avoiding a second jeopardy and has spe-
cifically disposed of the policy question 78 Unless the Court can fashion
a rule which interprets the fifth amendment consistently with its goal-
such as, for example, adopting the English rule that jeopardy does not
attach until the verdict 79 in the mistrial context-the Court subjects it-
76 See Note, supra note 26, at 1280.
77 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). For a somewhat ideosyncratic re-
ductionist view supporting the Ball rule, see Posner, Ecessive Sanctionsfor Governmental Miscon-
duct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1982).
78 For a judge's view of the policy issue see Fleming, The Th'ce of Perfect Justice, 58 JUDI-
CATURE 340, 344 (1975). Judge Fleming writes that
[i]f on appeal after judgment of conviction the trial is found substantially
defective or unfair the judgment should be reversed and the defendant go
free. . . .This proposal may sound revolutionary, but it is actually a return
to first principles. The English have always had a system of only one trial to
final judgment.
Id at 344. Judge Fleming thus would bar retrial whenever trial error was not "harmless"
within the meaning of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This article
proposes a more modest rule, which would bar retrial only when the trial error was "plain"
within the meaning of rule 52(b) and was directly caused by governmental conduct designed
improperly to convict.
For a recent decision discussing the difference between nonharmless errors, requiring
reversal under rule 52(a) if noticed at trial, and plain errors, requiring reversal under rule
52(b) even when not noticed at trial, see United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1340-43
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
79 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 453 & n.8.
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self to political censure when it substitutes its policy judgment for that of
the constitutional convention.
Perhaps more importantly, the Ball rule is based upon flawed
premises. First, the Ball rule assumes that multiple trials enhance the
reliability of the truth-seeking process. Even if the primary goal of the
Bill of Rights in the context of criminal justice administration were
truth-determination, however, the Court has acknowledged several
times that a second jeopardy, more often than not, increases the possibil-
ity of fabrication and erroneous dispositions.8 0 The adversary nature of
,criminal investigations and trials undercuts any presumption of in-
creased reliability."' Adherents of the Ball rule also assume that appel-
late courts regularly reverse convictions on the grounds of mere
technical defects and that if the Ball rule were modified, these courts
would instead affirm those convictions. This assumption-central to
the Ball decision-has become plainly untenable in light of the scope of
the harmless error rule.8 2 At the time of Ball, "even a trivial error at
trial resulted in reversal. 8a3 In response to judicial overreliance upon
formal defects, in 1919 Congress enacted the harmless error rule prohib-
iting reversals of judgments based upon "technical errors" that do not
affect the "substantial rights of the parties."8 4 In more recent years the
federal courts have relied upon this rule to affirm convictions in the face
of increasingly serious procedural or evidentiary errors,8 5 so that very
few criminal convictions are reversed for any reason. These few rever-
sals86 generally occur in cases where, notwithstanding a jury verdict, the
defendant's guilt is less than obvious.
Ultimately, the likelihood that appellate courts would not reverse a
decision if reversal precluded retrial is extremely marginal, especially
where reversal is based upon governmental overreaching. This article
thus proposes only a limited modification of the Ball rule to eliminate
the distinction between mistrial and appellate reversal cases where ma-
terial government overreaching has occurred and to make double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence consistent with the underlying constitutional
80 See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 686-90 nn.19-30 (and cases cited therein) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in judgment).
81 See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prosecutors andjudges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629, 633
(1972); see also Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897).
82 FED. R. GRIM. P. 52(a); see United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir.
1982); R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970).
83 Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 538, 540
(1979).
84 Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(1976)).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1978); Wright v.
Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1080-82 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
86 For a discussion of the increasing frequency with which courts use the harmless error
doctrine, see Note, supra note 83, at 544-61.
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principles. The more plausible argument today may be that appellate
courts, mindful of the increasing expense of trial and retrial, would be
less inclined to order a new trial than to terminate the prosecution com-
pletely in the face of demonstrated overreaching.
In Burks v. United States,87 the Supreme Court unanimously held
that categorical distinctions beween appellate reversals and mistrials in
the context of double jeopardy law situations are not tenable.8 8 The
Court's analysis supports the elimination of a distinction between mis-
trial and appellate reversal cases involving judicial or prosecutorial over-
reaching, at least where the overreaching was obvious and intentional
and sufficiently affected the defendant's fundamental rights within the
meaning of the plain error doctrine to require a court to notice the error
even in the absence of a defense objection or motion.89 In Burks, the
petitioner argued
that had the District Court found the evidence at the first trial inade-
quate, as the Court of Appeals said it should have done, a second trial
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. . . . [I]t makes no differ-
ence that the determination of evidentiary insufficiency was made by
a reviewing court since the double jeopardy considerations are the
same, regardless of which court decides that a judgment of acquittal is
in order.90
The Court ruled in Burks's favor stating that "[t]o hold otherwise Would
create a purely arbitrary distinction between those in petitioner's posi-
tion and others who would enjoy the benefit of a correct decision by the
District Court." 9 1 By analogy, in a case involving prosecutorial or judi-
cial overreaching, it should make no difference that the determination of
overreaching is made on appeal as opposed to during trial. As a practi-
cal matter, overreaching may not be discovered until appellate review.92
If courts fail to bar retrial, regardless of the level of review at which
prosecutorial overreaching is found, government conduct will go uncen-
sured, the integrity of the judicial process will be tainted, and the double
jeopardy clause will be judicially undermined.93
87 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
88 Id at 16-18.
89 See generally Fleming, supra note 78, at 344 (advocating elimination of Ball rule).
Most recently, the Supreme Court has held that the plain error rule should be "used
sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982).
90 437 U.S. at 5-6.
91 Id at 11.
92 In some cases the defendant may not move for mistrial because he is not aware of the
full extent of governmental misconduct. A primary example of such misconduct would be
subornation of or acquiescence in perjury. The defendant should not be without a remedy
when such overreaching is discovered at the appellate level merely because the government
was initially able to conceal its conduct. See Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theo.7 of
Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 103.
93 Barring retrial not only deters prosecutorial or judicial misconduct but also protects
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This proposed expansion of Burks would constitute an exception to
the Ball rule, and would admittedly conflict with the Court's statement
the integrity of the judicial process itself. Compare Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979)
(judicial process implicated) with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (deterring police mis-
conduct). See airo Vaccari, Governmental Misconduct and the Right of Liberty, 9 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 279 (1980) (asserting that due process analysis should be expanded to protect defendants
more fully from governmental misconduct).
These concerns underlie the due process clause as well. In Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972), where the Court required a new trial after the prosecutor failed to reveal that
a government witness had been promised leniency in return for his testimony, the Court
summarized its application of due process analysis to trial misconduct:
As long ago as Moone v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), this Court
made clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation
of known false evidence is incompatible with "rudimentary demands of jus-
tice." This was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), we said, "[t]he same result obtains when the
State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when
it appears." Id, at 269. Thereafter Brady v. Martland, 373 U.S. [83, 87 (1963)],
held that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial "irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Id at 153. The Court further refined these due process principles in United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976). There the Court recognized that "[a]lthough in Mooney the Court had
been primarily concerned with the willful misbehavior of the prosecutor, in Brady the Court
focused on the harm to the defendant resulting from nondisclosure." Id at 104 n.10. The
Court in Agurs adopted the reasoning of Brady and emphasized that the constitutional duty to
disclose information cannot be
measured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If
evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he should be presumed to
recognize its significance, even if he had actually overlooked it. Conversely, if
evidence actually has no probative significance at all, no purpose would be
served by requiring a new trial simply because an inept prosecutor incorrectly
believed he was suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense. If the
suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the char-
acter of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.
Id at 110 (citation and footnote omitted). Thus, due process analysis focuses on the impact of
nondisclosed or perjured testimony on the determination of factual guilt. A court finding a
due process violation must overturn the unconstitutional conviction. Such a finding, how-
ever, does not bar retrial for the purpose of protecting the defendant from embarrassment,
expense, and ordeal caused by governmental misconduct. Due process only limits the right to
retry a defendant when there is danger that the decision to reprosecute will be vindictive:
Due Process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sen-
tence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness
may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or
collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defend-
ant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of
the sentencing judge.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969). Likewise, "[a] person convicted of an
offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the
State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting
him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration." Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 28 (1974). But see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (due process not
violated when prosecutor carries out threat made during plea negotiations to reindict defend-
ant if he does not plead guilty to original offense).
This article proposes that the Moony-Giglio line of cases be analyzed, for perhaps the first
time, under the double jeopardy clause and its policies.
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in United States v. Scott, 94 that "[t]he successful appeal of a judgment of
conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict. . . poses no bar to further prosecution on the same
charge."'95 This dictum, however, must be read in light of the Court's
recognition of the exceptions for prosecutorial overreaching.96
III
MAINTAINING DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION IN THE
FACE OF GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT
Until Oregon v. Kennedy, the Court had not set forth explicit guide-
lines delineating the types of prosecutorial misconduct that would pre-
94 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
95 Id at 90-91. Scott involved a dismissal as opposed to a mistrial. Lee v. United States,
432 U.S. 23 (1977) established that dismissals may in some cases be treated the same as mistri-
als. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Scott, emphasized that a case in which a
defendant moves for a dismissal
is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant
who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having
the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact. It is instead a picture of a
defendant who chooses to avoid conviction and imprisonment, not because of
his assertion that the Government failed to make out a case against him, but
because of a legal claim that the Government's case against him must fail
even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id at 96. Justice Rehnquist asserted that
the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings
against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of
which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy
Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the
trial court in favor of the defendant.
Id at 98-99. Logically, there must be some level of governmental misconduct that can be
characterized as an example of the "all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant."
Once that level of conduct is present, further proceedings should not be allowed, regardless of
whether there has been a final determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. In Scott,
the aspect of Dinitz that emphasized the defendant's continuing control over the course to be
followed was applied to a dismissal case. The crucial qualification enunciated in Dinitz, re-
quiring that retrial be barred in some instances regardless of defendant choice, should also be
applied to dismissal cases. See generally Note, supra note 53; Note, DoubleJeopard Consequence of
Dismissals, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 117 (1980).
96 437 U.S. at 94. Justice Rehnquist based this dictum on Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1 (1978), where the Court stated that
reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does
not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove
its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been con-
victed through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental re-
spect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or
prosecutorial misconduct.
Id at 15 (emphasis added). Nothing in this language necessarily cuts against the need to bar
.retrial in cases involving prosecutorial overreaching constituting plain error intended to inter-
fere with the proper and lawful functioning ofjudicial process and necessary to avoid acquit-
tal, as opposed to erroneous conduct that could not be said to have affected the defendant's
substantial rights.
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clude reprosecution after a defendant's motion for mistrial. In United
States v. Jorn, the Court held that "where circumstances develop not at-
tributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the de-
fendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to
reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial error."'97 In a footnote, the Court developed the
difference between overreaching and mere error, asserting that "where a
defendant's mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial
impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might well be
barred."98s As noted earlier, 99 however, the Dinitz Court stated that gov-
ernmental acts must be "intended to provoke mistrial requests" before
they will be held to bar reprosecution.U°° Most recently, in DiFrancesco
and Oregon v. Kennedy, the Court interpreted Dinitz to mean that "re-
prosecution of a defendant who has successfully moved for a mistrial is
not barred, so long as the Government did not deliberately seek to pro-
voke the mistrial request." 01
Despite the ambiguous dicta in the Court's pre-Oregon v. Kennedy
decisions suggesting that reprosecution would be barred only when the
government actually intended to provoke mistrial, several lower courts
read these decisions broadly, thereby expanding the scope of this rem-
edy. In United States v. Kessler, 102 for example, the government know-
ingly introduced into evidence a rifle that was totally unrelated to the
conspiracy at issue in the trial, thereby attempting to mislead the jury.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in barring reprosecution,
stated: "To find 'prosecutorial overreaching,' the Government must
have, through 'gross negligence or intentional misconduct,' caused ag-
gravated circumstances to develop which 'seriously prejudice[d] a de-
fendant' causing him to 'reasonably conclude that a continuation of the
tainted proceeding would result in a conviction.' ,103 In United States v.
Martin, 104 the prosecutor read prejudicial portions of the defendant's
grand jury testimony to the jury in violation of his assurances to the
judge that he had deleted the irrelevant and prejudicial statements con-
tained in that testimony. Barring reprosecution on the grounds of
prosecutorial overreaching, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stated that even "[i]f the government's actions in reading this irrelevant
and highly prejudicial testimony to the jury were not intentionally
designed to provoke a mistrial request, at a minimum they constitute
97 400 U.S. at 485 (footnote omitted).
98 Id at 485 n.12.
99 See supra notes 19, 69 and accompanying text.
1oo 424 U.S. at 611.
lOt DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130.
102 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976).
103 Id at 1256 (footnote omitted).
104 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977).
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gross negligence. [Such actions] can best be described as prosecutorial
error undertaken to harass or prejudice the defendant-prosecutorial
overreaching." 1 0 5
Notwithstanding language to the contrary injom and the Fifth and
Eighth Circuit decisions in Kessler and Martin, the Supreme Court, in
Oregon v. Kennedy, held that
[p]rosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or
overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's mo-
tion,. . . does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecu-
tor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. . . .Only where the governmental conduct in question is in-
tended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a de-
fendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having
succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion. 1
0 6
The majority opinion in Oregon v. Kennedy offers no example of
prosecutorial conduct specifically designed to provoke a mistrial rather
105 Id at 140 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the interpretation given pros-
ecutorial overreaching by other lower courts, see Comment, supra note 26, at 121-30; Com-
ment, supra note 30, at 982-90. Other circuits have not adopted the liberal position taken by
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits that permits a finding of prosecutorial overreaching in instances
of gross negligence by the prosecutor. Accord Government of V.I. v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869, 872
n.5 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that only Fifth and Eighth Circuits have accepted this standard).
The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, has taken an especially hard-line stance on this issue, requir-
ing a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor to goad the defendant into requesting
a mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 593 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Buzzard, 540 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir.
1976).
Recent cases in which courts have considered the double jeopardy issue where the de-
fendant alleged government overreaching are collected in State v. Harrell, 85 Wis. 2d 331,
336, 270 N.W.2d 428, 431-32 (1978).
In United States v. Broderick, 425 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Fla. 1977), the court, citing Kessler,
barred retrial on doublejeopardy grounds, because the prosecutor had deliberately elicited a
hearsay statement from a witness despite two warnings from the court not to do so. Further-
more, the prosecutor's conduct was in violation of a preliminary evidentiary agreement be-
tween the two parties that had been ratified by the court. Where a defense lawyer engages in
such conduct, the normal response is to hold the attorney in criminal contempt. See, e.g.,
United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 247-53 (7th Cir. 1982).
106 456 U.S. at 675-76. The majority recognized that its holding conflicted with the lan-
guage in some earlier opinions that suggested a broader rule. See id at 677-78. The holding
acknowledges that defendants, after a mistrial but prior to reprosecution, still may move to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds where prosecutorial "conduct giving rise to the successful
motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial." Id
at 679.
Thus, the majority opinion suggests a subjective test focusing on the prosecutor's mental
state, rather than an objective test focusing on the prosecutor's conduct as a reasonable de-
fense counsel would perceive it. By contrast, the "objective facts and circumstances" that
Justice Powell would rely on in determining intent should prevent a district court from sim-
ply adopting a prosecutor's disavowal of an intent to cause a mistrial and should allow more
flexible appellate review of such a trial court determination. Id at 679-80 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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than gain a conviction. 10 7 Nor does it suggest how a trial court should
respond when it not only finds that the prosecutor's primary intent was
to gain a conviction, but also finds a secondary intent to avoid acquittal
by way of a mistrial. Thus the opinion does not clearly indicate whether
retrial would be barred under circumstances such as those in Kessler or
Martin, where the government knowingly introduced prejudicial and
inadmissible evidence to the jury.108 Because the trial courts will retain
substantial discretion in determining intent, double jeopardy jurispru-
dence will develop whimsically, at best.
The Court's rationale for eroding double jeopardy protection in the
context of prosecutorial misconduct is difficult to ascertain. Justice
Rehnquist pointed to the lack of any standard by which to measure
overreaching. Perhaps a more convincing explanation for the decision is
to be found in the Court's desire to reduce double jeopardy litigation in
the trial and appellate courts.109
Although the Court has rejected traditional waiver analysis as a
basis for judicially created exceptions to the double jeopardy clause," 0
Oregon v. Kennedy seems to rely upon a hybrid waiver theory originated
in Dinitz and Scott. In those cases the Court focused on the alleged "de-
liberate election" of the defendant to terminate the trial, thus allowing
the defendant to retain "primary control" over the course of the litiga-
tion. Of course, the entire discussion regarding prosecutorial overreach-
107 Justice Stevens's opinion, concurring in the judgment, does offer such examples. See,
e.g., 456 U.S. at 683, n. 13, 688 n.23. But see id at 688 n.24, (quoting Justice Marshall's skepti-
cism as to whether government ever tailors its misconduct specifically to provoke defendant to
move for mistrial instead of more generally attempting to prejudice defendant). As a result of
the decision in Oregon v. Kennedy, prosecutors will be careful to demonstrate that they actually
intended to cause the more extreme form of prejudice, namely conviction.
108 The relevant questions are what was the prosecutor's intent and how should a trial
court make this determination. The overly aggressive prosecutor, for example, rather than
delaying trial to allow missing witnesses to appear would be more likely to risk mistrial by
soliciting hearsay evidence from other witnesses or otherwise attempting to fabricate evi-
dence. In such a case, the prosecutor honestly could state that he was seeking a conviction
rather than a mistrial. Even under the standard proposed by Justice Powell, see supra note
106, the trial court would have to allow retrial. Thus, Oregon V. Kenned, has the unfortunate
effect of encouraging the more outrageous forms of misconduct.
109 456 U.S. at 677-78. The combination of theJorn rule, which allows defendants to
move for dismissal on double jeopardy grounds after having successfully moved for a mistrial
on grounds of government overreaching, the Burks rule, discussed at supra notes 87-96 and
accompanying text, and the Court's decision in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977),
authorizing interlocutory appeals from the denial of pretrial double jeopardy motions, has
increased the number of double jeopardy appeals in the last decade.
Justice Rehnquist believes that a reduction in double jeopardy litigation will actually
benefit defendants. See 456 U.S. at 676-77. The opinion repeats the premise that the possibil-
ity of a subsequent double jeopardy motion by a defendant moving for a mistrial will induce
trial courts to deny defendant's motion. Eliminating the untenable distinction between mis-
trial and appellate reversal cases would solve this problem.
1 10 See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609; see also supra notes 47-53, 64-69 and
accompanying text.
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ing assumes that overreaching deprives the defendant of any real control
or choice regarding the trial. Seen from this vantage, Oregon v. Kennedy
draws no support from the language of or policy underlying the double
jeopardy clause, prior Court decisions, or legal reasoning. Rather, the
holding is a naked exercise in judicial administrative rulemaking-the
direct opposite of the Court's decision to fashion the exclusionary rule in
the absence of explicit authority in the Bill of Rights.
It is clear that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, in Kessler and Martin,
intended to provide greater protection for criminal defendants. At the
time of those decisions, it was unclear whether the Supreme Court
would adopt a similar position if directly faced with the issue. Despite
the Court's decision to the contrary, there are compelling reasons for
adopting a broad definition of overreaching, aside from the literal word-
ing of the clause, the English rule, and the language inJorn. If retrial is
barred on grounds of overreaching only when a defendant can show
that the government intended to provoke a mistrial, then defendants
have no protection from unlawful government acts intended to
prejudice or harm the defendant but not to provoke a mistrial, and
which surely would result in a conviction if no mistrial were granted.
Such a restrictive application of double jeopardy protection would give
the government an incentive to use tactics that abridge the rights of
defendants. These tactics are difficult to detect at trial or, if detected,
are never remedied as envisioned by the clause. After all, would a prose-
cutor ever seek solely to provoke a mistrial rather than gain a
conviction?
An additional consideration favoring the broader definition of over-
reaching is that an inquiry into the mental state of the judge or prosecu-
tor would be an extremely controversial and inadequate means of
implementing double jeopardy policy. One commentator states the
problem pointedly:
[R]egardless of the prosecutorial motive, the defendant suffers severe
deprivation of his rights. Constitutional rights are to be protected ir-
respective of the motive or intent of the actor whose conduct has occa-
sioned an infringement of them . . . . [S]uch rights should not
ultimately be forced to rely for protection upon as subjective and illu-
sory a determination as intent."'
To provide citizens with adequate protection from government harass-
ment and defendants a meaningful choice to proceed before a chosen
jury, the fundamental premises of the double jeopardy clause dictate
that courts bar retrial in instances of judicial or prosecutorial miscon-
duct sufficient in magnitude and clarity to implicate the plain error
rule," 2 regardless of whether that conduct was narrowly intended to
I 11 Comment, supra note 24, at 907.
112 The plain error rule is set forth in FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Plain errors are those that
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provoke a mistrial.
Under this test, valid overreaching claims would be stated only in
those few cases where the judge, prosecutor, or perhaps the chief investi-
gator as government witness, intentionally and unambiguously inter-
fered with the proper functioning of the judicial process after jeopardy
has attached in such a way as to affect materially the likely outcome of
the trial. Despite Justice Rehnquist's assertions to the contrary in Oregon
v. Kennedy, an overreaching standard can be defined as requiring: (1)
governmental misconduct occurring or continuing after jeopardy at-
taches, (2) accomplished with the requisite mens rea, (3) which is likely to
affect the outcome of the trial by eliminating a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt that might otherwise have existed. 1 3
A particularly obnoxious effect of the Oregon v. Kennedy rule, which
the above standard would nullify, is that it creates inducements for the
prosecutor to avoid the appearance of seeking or benefiting from a mis-
trial. Thus, even where manifest necessity might otherwise exist for a
mistrial on the government's motion, or where the government and
court might normally agree that apparently unintentional or nonfunda-
mental error should abort the proceeding at the defendant's request, the
prosecutor is likely to argue against mistrial and may take extra-legal
steps to seek a conviction.' 14
CONCLUSION
Recognizing that the double jeopardy clause implicates two funda-
mental interests-the right to proceed before a particular forum and the
right to be free from government harassment-the Supreme Court has
attempted to protect both interests while simultaneously cutting back
on the seemingly mandatory language of the clause. In cases in which
judicial or prosecutorial overreaching forced the defendant to move for
a mistrial, the traditional manifest necessity and waiver tests have
are so fundamental a violation of the defendant's rights that they require reversal regardless
of the defendant's failure to object to them at trial. 3A C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 851, at 294-95 (2d ed. 1982).
113 Professor Wright further elaborates on the plain error rule, stating that the level of
error involved must be "obvious and substantial" or so "serious and manifest" that it affects
the very integrity of the trial process. See 3A C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, § 856, at 336.
Justice Powell has characterized plain error as an " 'inexcusable procedural default.' " Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 513 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 163-64 (1982)(discussing purpose of plain error rule); Wangerin, "Plain Error"
and "Fundamental Fairness" Toward a Definition of Exceptions to the Rules of Procedural Default, 29
DE PAUL L. REV. 753, 771-78 (1980) (discussing evolution of plain error rule in Supreme
Court cases).
114 See generally Vaccari, supra note 93 and accompanying discussion. Whereas the cases
cited in the Vaccari article rely upon the due process clause as precluding prosecution in the
face of government misconduct, traditional due process analysis would support only vacating
a particular conviction. This article hypothesizes that the double jeopardy clause provides a
more specific and direct remedy for individuals confronted with government overreaching.
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proved inadequate to vindicate a defendant's right to be free from har-
assment. The Court, therefore, has acknowledged that in some cases
courts must bar retrial regardless of whether the defendant's right to
choose to proceed before the first forum was preserved. To supply this
remedy with an analytical foundation consistent with fifth amendment
policy, however, it is necessary to look beyond the "settled" principles of
law summarized in United States v. DiFrancesco. Fully implementing this
protection against governmental harassment requires that the long-
standing rule of UnitedStates v. Ball be further reevaluated, following the
lead of Burks v. United States, to permit elimination of the artificial and
untenable distinctions between mistrial and appellate reversal cases.
Trial courts should bar reprosecution when they declare a mistrial on
the grounds of governmental overreaching. Similarly, appellate courts
should bar reprosecution upon discovering overreaching founded upon
unambiguous bad faith prosecutorial or judicial conduct serious enough
to eliminate any reasonable doubt of guilt that otherwise may have
existed.
To the extent that Oregon v. Kennedy permits courts to consider only
a nebulous intent by the prosecutor to provoke a mistrial, it will cause
widely disparate results in apparently similar situations and perhaps ul-
timately might lead to a de facto judicial repeal of the double jeopardy
clause. The Court should reconsider its decision. State courts, free to
interpret their own constitutional provisions regarding double jeopardy,
should do so more broadly than the Court has in Oregon v. Kennedy. De-
fendants should not lose their double jeopardy protection simply be-
cause a prosecutor intends to seek a conviction rather than provoke a
mistrial through conduct that could accomplish either result.
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